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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The process of “going through” a divorce is an agonizing, stressful, and life 
changing event for most people.  The emotional and financial stresses that accompany the 
breakup of a marriage, particularly a long marriage, frequently begin when the parties 
start contemplating a divorce and last, in many instances, several years after the legal 
battles have been fought.  One of the most stressful aspects of the divorce proceeding is 
the division of property.  In Michigan, those stresses are further compounded by a 
complex statutory system whose hallmark is uncertainty. 
 The focus of this uncertainty centers around two issues.  The first, and less 
contentious issue due to Michigan Court Rule 7.2151 and the Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Reeves v. Reeves,2 asks whether Michigan possesses a unitary classification version of 
the equitable property distribution system (“unitary classification”) or a dual 
classification version of the equitable property distribution system (“dual 
                                                          
1 See MCR 7.215 (I) (1) (2001).  This court rule holds that “[a] panel of the Court of Appeals must follow 
the rule of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after 
November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of 
the Court of Appeals as provided in this rule.”  Id.   
2 226 Mich. App. 490, 575 N.W.2d 1 (1997). 
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classification”).3  Despite the fact that the Michigan Supreme Court has not ruled on this 
particular subject, and that there exist excellent arguments for Michigan as a unitary 
classification system, it will be shown that Michigan has adopted a dual classification 
version of the equitable property distribution system.4  The issue then becomes how to 
properly interpret Michigan’s statutory scheme—and, in terms of public policy, to what 
extent that system incorporates the marital partnership theory.5   
 This paper will focus on the above-mentioned issues and on the problems facing 
Michigan attorneys as they attempt to advocate for their clients.  As such, the two 
different models of equitable distribution, dual classification and unitary classification 
will be examined.  Additionally, this paper will briefly review the different arguments on 
this subject posed by Messrs. Brett R. Turner and John F. Schaefer, two preeminent 
attorneys in the field of family law.6   The questions left unanswered by the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Reeves v. Reeves, including the role of Michigan’s four property 
                                                          
3 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 114.  [hereinafter Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks];  see 
also Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership Theory Through the 
Dual Classification System, 67 Miss. L.J. 115, 125-26 (1997).  Both the unitary and dual classification 
property distribution systems are two different models within the equitable distribution system.  See 
Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, at 114.  In short, a unitary system allows judges to divide all of the 
parties’ property—regardless of how or when it came to the owning party.  See id.  Ms. Bell refers to this 
method of distribution as the “kitchen sink” or “hotchpot” system.  See Bell at 125.  
4 Reeves v. Reeves, 226 Mich. App. 490, 575 N.W.2d 1 (1997); see also Daly v. Daly, No. 217638, 2001 
Mich. App. Lexis at *2 (June, 8 2001); see also McLean v. Mclean, No. 223757, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 
802 at *3-4 (April 27, 2001); see also Bachran v. Bachran, No. 226937, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1178 at *6 
(August 21, 2001); see also Zerrenner v. Zerrenner, No. 219301, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 621 at *2 
(February 2, 2001). 
5 See Bell, supra note 3, at 124-25.  “Equitable distribution is based upon the marital partnership theory 
adopted from community property law.”  Id. 
6 Mr. Turner is the Editor-in-Chief of “Divorce Litigation” and works as a senior attorney with the National 
Legal Research Group based out of Charlottesville Virginia.  See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, 
supra note 3, at 122.  He has completed over 1000 research projects on family law issues over the past 
fifteen years.  See id.  He is a practicing member of the North Carolina Bar.  See id.  Mr. Schaefer is the 
founder and senior partner of the Law Firm of John F. Schaefer.  See John F. Schaefer, The Uncertain 
State of Michigan Equitable Distribution Law Post-Reeves, Michigan Bar Journal, 79 Mich. B.J. 168, 171 
(2000).  He has been an adjunct professor at Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law, a trustee of 
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division statutes, what exactly constitutes marital property, and how that property should 
be divided will also be addressed.  Finally, it will be shown that the property distribution 
system adopted by Michigan incorporates the very best aspects of the marital partnership 
theory while accounting for its analytical weaknesses. 
 
 
I. UNITARY CLASSIFICATION DIVISION 
 In order to fully understand why some level of controversy persists over whether 
Michigan possesses a unitary classification or dual classification property distribution 
system, it is necessary to acquire at least a working knowledge of the differences between 
these two systems.  The following two sections will highlight the major differences 
between the systems.  Additionally, examples of other states’ statutes that have clearer 
and more precise models of property distribution will be used to further demonstrate the 
complex and unique nature of Michigan’s statutory system. 
   In its simplest description, a jurisdiction following the unitary classification 
system has the authority to divide any asset owned by the parties upon divorce 
“regardless of how and when the asset was acquired.”7  This is the model followed by 
such jurisdictions as Ohio and Massachusetts.8  One very important distinction, however, 
between the model followed by Massachusetts and the model espoused by unitary 
property division advocates in Michigan is the fact that there exists statutory authority in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Detroit College of Law, and Chairperson of the Detroit College of Law foundation.  See id.  Mr. 
Schaefer is a member of the Michigan Bar and specializes in domestic relations.  See id.    
7 John F. Schaefer, The Uncertain State of Michigan Equitable Distribution Law Post-Reeves, Michigan 
Bar Journal, 79 Mich. B.J. 168, (2000). 
8 See Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property 40 (2nd ed. 1994).   
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Massachusetts unequivocally identifying Massachusetts as a unitary classification 
jurisdiction.9  There is no such clarity in Michigan.10   
Reproduced for the reader’s edification is a portion of the most important part of the 
Massachusetts statute.   
In determining . . . the nature and value of the property, if any, to be 
assigned, the court . . . shall consider the length of the marriage, the 
conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, 
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, 
employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of the parties and the 
opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. 
 
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1993). 
 
 Those that advocate for a unitary classification system in Michigan necessarily 
argue that, although this list of express elements is not found in any of the Michigan 
statutes, it can be gleaned from a Supreme Court opinion.11   That opinion, Sparks v. 
Sparks,12 sets out a list of factors similar to those listed in the Massachusetts statute.13 
 The unitary property distribution system has received its share of criticism.14   Its 
cited weaknesses include predictability and consistency.15   Additionally, it may have a 
tendency to foster unnecessary litigation.16 
                                                          
9 See id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West. 1998)).  The Massachusetts statute clearly 
states: “Upon divorce . . . [t]he court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the state of 
the other, including but not limited to, all vested and non-vested benefits, rights and funds accrued during 
the marriage. . .”  Id. 
10 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 114; see also Schaefer, supra note 7, at 170.  Advocates for a 
unitary classification system in Michigan can only convincingly advocate for this system by pre-supposing 
that Michigan’s property distribution system is not entirely statutory in nature.  See Schaefer, supra note 7, 
at 170. 
11 See Schaefer, supra note 7, at 169.  
12 440 Mich. 141, 159-60, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901 (1992). 
13 See Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 159-60, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901 (1992). 
14 See Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property, supra note 8, at 42.  The unitary division system is 
sometimes criticized as an arbitrary and inherently unfair system of distribution.  See id.  Why, some have 
asked, should one party’s separate inheritance be thrown ‘into the mix’ for division merely because the two 
parties had been married for a time?  On the surface, the system appears to ignore the marital partnership 
theory and the idea that an award of property should take into account the individual contributions of the 
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II. DUAL CLASSIFICATION PROPERTY DIVISION 
 Dual classification systems introduce two new terms to the property division 
lexicon, separate or non-marital property.17  At the outset, before the property division 
begins, as a matter of law, the trial judge separates the property previously owned by the 
marital unit into two different categories.18  One category is commonly referred to as 
marital property and the other is termed non-marital or separate property.19  Essentially, 
“[s]eparate property is awarded to the owning spouse [and] marital property is divided 
equitably” between the two spouses.20  Separate property is generally defined as that 
property which was acquired before the marriage, by inheritance, or by the personal 
efforts of only one of the parties.21  The State of Virginia possesses a developed, dual 
classification system.22   
                                                                                                                                                                             
parties.  See id.  When implemented, however, this is not the case.  See id.  As Mr. Turner has noted, “[t]he 
all property [or unitary] system reaches fairer results in practice than one might first suspect.”  Id.  Most 
unitary or all-property division statutes, including the just reprinted Massachusetts statute, include in their 
terms some standard allowing for the court to take into account the contributions of the parties.  See id.   As 
a result, most courts in practice tend to award the majority of an asset’s value to the spouse who had 
contributed the majority of the asset’s value.  See id.  Generally, when courts stray from this logic, there is 
valid reasoning that can be found in one of the other factors.  Those other factors may include the age, 
health, life status, or financial need of the parties.  See id.  Thus, the marital partnership theory remains a 
driving force behind unitary classification systems, albeit not as readily obvious as in a dual classification 
system.   See id. 
15 See id.  Mr. Turner notes that other perceived weaknesses of the unitary classification system include a 
lack of consistency and predictability, and a tendency to foster litigation.  See id.  Regarding consistency 
and predictability, although the statutes of the minority of states that follow the unitary system set out a list 
of factors that should be considered, the ultimate decision on how to divide the asset belongs to the trial 
judge. This great deal of discretion leads to inconsistent judgments and works to upset the predictability of 
the system.   See id. 
16 See id. at 43.  As a result of this unpredictability, greater emphasis is given to litigation.  See id.  Because 
every asset may be divided, and the parties may not necessarily be aware of the trial judge’s disposition, 
each asset is contested.  Thus, litigation is increased. 
17 See Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property, 43 (2nd ed. 1994). 
18 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 114.   
19 See id. 
20 Id. 
21 See VA. CODE  ANN. § 20-107.3 (2001); see also Michie’s Jurisprudence of Virginia and West Virginia, 
Divorce and Alimony  § 50, 2 (2001).  Michie’s jurisprudence also sheds some light on what is considered 
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The Virginia statute reads as follows: 
Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon decreeing a 
divorce from the bond of matrimony, or upon filing with the court . . . the 
court upon request of either party, shall determine the legal title as 
between the parties, and the ownership and value of all property, real or 
personal, tangible or intangible, of the parties and shall consider which of 
such property is separate property, which is marital property, and which is 
part separate and part marital . . . . 
 
 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (2001). 
 
 This paragraph is the first to appear in the Virginia statute, and just as clearly as 
Massachusetts indicates that it follows a unitary classification system, Virginia makes 
just as clear that it has adopted a dual classification system.23  Furthermore, Virginia’s 
statute clearly defines separate property.  Virginia’s statutory system presents a stark 
contrast to that of Michigan’s.  Unfortunately, Michigan’s statutory system does not 
possess the clarity and simplicity found in Virginia’s statutes.24  
 Separate property is (1) all property, real and personal, acquired by either 
party before the marriage; (ii) all property acquired during the marriage by 
bequest, devise, descent, survivorship or gift from a source other than the 
other party; (iii) all property acquired during the marriage in exchange for 
or the from the proceeds of a sale of separate property, provided that such 
property acquired during the marriage is maintained as separate property . 
. . The increase in value of separate property during the marriage is 
separate property, unless marital property or personal efforts of either 
                                                                                                                                                                             
marital property.  “All property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital 
property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is separate property. . . .”  Id. 
22 See John F. Schaefer, The Uncertain State of Michigan Equitable Distribution Law Post-Reeves, 
Michigan Bar Journal, 79 Mich. B.J. 168, 170 (2000).  
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
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party have contributed to such increases and then only to the extent of the 
increases in value attributable to such contributions. 
 
 VA CODE ANN.  § 20-107.3 (2001). 
 Dual classification has also received a number of critiques.   However, it is also 
often lauded as the fairer of the two systems, the more predictable, and the intuitively 
more acceptable of the two systems to the public.25  
III.         MESSRS. TURNER’S AND SCHAEFER’S POSITIONS 
There are, at present, two articles which discuss the controversy over whether  
Michigan possesses a dual or unitary classification system.  In his article, Eating Jello 
With Chopsticks, Brett Turner argues that the Michigan statutory scheme, when read in 
conjunction with the correct cases, provides for a dual classification system.26  Mr. 
Turner asserts that the four statutes lay the framework for the dual classification scheme, 
and that the role of the factors in Sparks v. Sparks27 is to determine the equitable division 
of the marital property.28   
A. ARGUMENTS FOR UNITARY CLASSIFICATION 
Mr. Schaefer, on the other hand, relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Sparks v. Sparks argues that the common law power to divide property by the courts still 
                                                          
25 See Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property, supra note 17, at 43.  Regarding its widespread 
acceptability, a majority of the states now utilize some form of dual classification.  See id.  Arguably the 
dual classification system brings an element of predictability and intuitive correctness.  See id.  “There is 
considerable common sense in the notion that property acquired during the marriage is ‘ours,’ while 
property acquired from extra-judicial sources is ‘his’ or ‘hers.’”  Id. 
26 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 115. 
27 440 Mich. 141, 159-60, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901 (1992). 
28 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 115-16.  The author of this paper generally agrees with Mr. 
Turner’s analysis with some modifications and expansions/elaborations of Mr. Turner’s theories. 
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exists in Michigan, and as such, that Michigan possesses a unitary classification system.29  
The basic premise of Mr. Schaefer’s argument rests on the underlying logic behind the 
Sparks court’s refusal to hold that any type of rigid formulation should govern property 
distribution.30 
The argument for a unitary system in Michigan can be expressed in the following 
manner.  First, the intent of the court in Sparks is strongly against the adoption of any 
strict property division equation.31  The trial courts should be provided broad discretion 
to decide what is considered equitable by the facts of each particular case.  Second, the 
court made a list of mandatory extra-statutory considerations.32  The Supreme Court 
emphasized to lower courts that these are relevant considerations and that the lower 
courts are required to make specific findings of fact as to each of the factors which are 
relevant to the distribution of property.33  Third, the roles of the statutes are as a 
codification of some of the relevant factors enunciated by the court in Sparks.34  Finally, 
Sparks is a Supreme Court opinion and is, or should be, controlling over the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Reeves v. Reeves.35 
                                                          
29 See John F. Schaefer, The Uncertain State of Michigan Equitable Distribution Law Post-Reeves, 
Michigan Bar Journal, 79 Mich. B.J. 168, 170 (2000).  Mr. Schaefer writes that the court explicitly held 
that “[i]t is not desirable, or feasible, for us to establish a rigid framework . . . [t]he trial court is given 
broad discretion in fashioning its rulings and there can be no strict mathematical formula.”  Id.  (quoting 
Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 158-59, 485 N.W.2d 893, 900-01 (1992)).  Furthermore, the court in 
Sparks provided a list of considerations that are not explicitly listed in any statutes.  See id.  Mr. Schaefer 
argues that by listing these extra-statutory considerations, and encouraging the lower courts to follow them, 
the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the premise that property distribution is governed entirely by statute.  
See id. 
30 See Sparks, 440 Mich. at 158; see also id. at 169. 
31 See id. at 159.  The Court specifically noted that “the division of property is not governed by any set 
rules.”  See also Schaefer, supra note 29, at 169. 
32 See id. at 159-60;  see also Schaefer, supra note 29, at 170.  
33 See id. 
34 See Schaefer, supra note 29, at 170.  Mr. Schaefer writes, “In other words, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that the statute only codified what would ultimately become the second Sparks factor for dividing 
marital property.”  Id.  
35 226 Mich. App. 490, 575 N.W.2d 1 (1997). 
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Using the system espoused by Mr. Schaefer and the court's decision in Sparks, 
Michigan’s system would be unitary and all property would be divided according to the 
following factors:36 
[T]he following factors are to be considered wherever they are relevant to 
the circumstances of the particular case:  (1) duration of the marriage, (2) 
contributions of the parties to the marital estate, (3) age of the parties, (4) 
health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6) necessities and 
circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8) past 
relations and conduct of the parties, (9) general principles of equity. 
 
 Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 159-60 (1992). 
 
In terms of practice, this system would certainly be easier to use.  The lawyer 
advocating for his client would know what factors the courts rely on and would be able to 
                                                          
36 See id.  Mr. Schaefer’s criticism of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Reeves is twofold.  First, it is 
accurately pointed out that the Reeves opinion ignores a “contrary line of cases that [should] take 
precedence.” Id.  The courts in those cases failed to cite statutory authority directly on point and instead 
chose a broad and perhaps questionable interpretation of § 18. The Court of Appeals noted that, although 
the exact language of the statute provides for pension benefits acquired during the marriage, it did not 
specifically exclude pension benefits acquired before the marriage.  See id.  Although it is not uncommon 
for courts to draw inferences from a statute’s silence on the subject, it would appear as though a more 
plausible reading would have been that § 18 allows for only the division of pension benefits acquired 
during the marriage.  And, as such, the court would have to look to one of the other remaining statutes in 
order to find authority to invade the separate estates of the owning spouse.  See Turner, Eating Jello With 
Chopsticks, supra note 28, at 118. 
         The second main criticism lies in the fact that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sparks v. Sparks 
includes the “contributions of the parties” in its list of considerations.   Id.  Since no statute explicitly 
requires the courts to first distinguish between marital and separate property--Mr. Schaefer views this 
preliminary initial division of assets as allowing “the tail of the second Sparks factor to wag the tail of the 
remaining eight.”  Id.  The court in Sparks v. Sparks held that there are nine equal factors, and that 
“contributions of the parties,” is just one of those factors.  Therefore, it is inappropriate to elevate that 
second factor to a position of greater import.  See id.  Mr. Schaefer also notes that a plain reading of the 
four Michigan statutes provides no indication that Michigan has adopted a dual classification system.  See 
id.   
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advocate using those factors.  In his most recent article on the subject, Mr. Turner has 
addressed some of the weaknesses of the unitary classification argument.37 
B. REEVES V. REEVES AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS  
Despite the compelling nature of Mr. Schaefer’s argument and the interesting 
questions it presents, this controversy has arguably been resolved by default due to 
Michigan Court Rule 7.215.  This court rule holds that once a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided an issue, the other panels of the Court of Appeals must follow that 
decision unless or until the Michigan Supreme Court grants certiorari and reverses or 
affirms that opinion.38     
That being said, the Court of Appeals has spoken, and in Reeves v. Reeves has 
clearly held that Michigan is a dual classification jurisdiction.39  In that case, the court 
explicitly recognized the existence of both separate property and marital property.40  The 
                                                          
37 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 28, at 115-21.  Mr. Turner also identifies a number 
of cases that seemingly conflict with the position advocated by Mr. Schaefer.  The first of those opinions is 
Dart v. Dart, 460 Mich. 573, 584-86, 597 N.W.2d 82, 86-88 (1999).  The issue in that case was whether a 
divorce rendered in England “violated Michigan’s public policy by treating the husband’s inherited trust 
income as separate property.”  Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 28, at 115.  The court, 
quoting from Lee v. Lee, 191 Mich. App. 73, 477 N.W.2d 432 (1991), recognized that property received 
through inheritance and kept separate from marital property was generally considered separate property 
unless one of the statutory exceptions apply.  Mr. Turner concludes by noting that if the courts of this state 
recognize the concept of separate property, then Michigan cannot be a unitary classification state.  See id.  
Additionally, Mr. Turner takes note with the argument that the Sparks court impliedly held that the 
common law judicial power to divide property still exists in Michigan.  See id.  To conclude that the trial 
courts possess the common law power to divide property appears to ignore the Supreme Court’s holding in 
both Charlton v. Charlton, 397 Mich. 84, 243 N.W.2d 261 (1976) and Stamadianos v. Stamadianos, 425 
Mich. 1, 385 N.W.2d 604, (1986).  See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 26, at 115-16.  
The Supreme Court in both of those cases decided both of those cases by noting that the power of the 
courts to divide property in Michigan was governed strictly by statute.  See id.    
            Note, however, that Dart v. Dart also dealt with such issues as comity and res judicata—this could 
have been an alternate basis for affirming the decision, as opposed to concluding that Michigan is a dual 
classification jurisdiction.  Indeed, the court in Dart v. Dart says “[c]onsequently, res judicata bars the 
plaintiff from relitigating the property distribution issues.  The English Court decided this issue on the 
merits.  Res Judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or essential 
facts are identical.”  Dart, 460 Mich. at 586. 
38 See MCR 7.215 (I) (1) 2001. 
39 See Reeves v. Reeves, 226 Mich. App. 490, 494, 575 N.W.2d 1, 2-4 (1997). 
40 See id. 
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court reasoned that in dividing property a trial court “must strive for an equitable division 
of increases in marital assets ‘that may have occurred between the beginning and the end 
of the marriage.’”41  The court then reasoned from this statement that the trial court’s first 
step is to determine and classify separate from marital property.42   
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals then makes the assertion that “[t]his distinction 
between marital and separate estates has long been recognized in this state.”43  The court 
refers to the policy of keeping marital property apart from separate property unless 
certain conditions exist as the “doctrine of noninvasion.”44  The court also cites two 
statutory exceptions to this doctrine, § 23 and § 401.45  
 What the court failed to spell out in Reeves, and what has been the subject of a 
great deal of confusion to even experienced attorneys is precisely how the statutory 
scheme is meant to work in its entirety.  Recall, that although the court in Reeves 
declared Michigan to be a dual classification state, and also clearly stated that § 23 and § 
401 provided exceptions to the doctrine of noninvasion, it did not specifically state what 
constitutes the marital estate, or how marital property should be divided and distributed.  
Indeed, the opinion provides a useful outline on how the property division process works, 
                                                          
41 Id. (citing Bone v. Bone, 148 Mich. App. 834, 838, 385 N.W.2d 706 (1986)). 
42 See id. at 493-94. 
43 Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 494.  (citing Charlton, 397 Mich. at 92-94). 
44 Id.  The court then explicitly states that which had gone unsaid throughout all of the other opinions--that 
only the marital estate is to be divided equitably between the two parties, and the two parties leave with 
their separate property intact with “no invasion by the other party.” Id.  Unless, that is, some statute 
specifically authorizes the invasion of that separate property. 
45 See id.  In discussing § 23, the court again finds that it provides an exception based on financial need. 
Further, the court notes that § 23 was properly applied in Charlton where there was a finding of financial 
need.  In its discussion of § 401, the court concludes that that particular statute was properly applied in 
Hanaway v. Hanaway, 208 Mich. App. 278, 527 N.W.2d 792, (1995).  In that case, the court found that 
because the wife had taken care of all domestic duties, she had allowed the husband to focus his attention 
on his family’s closely held corporation.  See Hanaway, 208 Mich. App. at 294.  As a result, the court 
found that the husband’s inherited stock had “appreciated because of defendant’s efforts facilitated by 
plaintiff’s efforts at home.” Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 494. (quoting Hanaway, 208 Mich. App. at 294). 
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but does not fully explain the process in a thorough step by step manner.  The following 
two sections will shed some light on those unanswered questions and will suggest an 
interpretation of Michigan’s statutory system.   
IV. MICHIGAN’S STATUTORY SYSTEM 
 Theoretically, there exists some minor level of controversy over whether 
Michigan, at present, has truly adopted a unitary classification or dual classification 
system.46   What is not debatable, however, is that Michigan possesses a system governed 
by statute.47  The Michigan Supreme Court clearly stated in Stamadianos v. 
Stamadianos48 that “there is no common-law authority to grant a judgment of divorce.”49  
Furthermore, the court went on to note that “[t]he jurisdiction of the circuit courts in 
matters of divorce is strictly statutory.”50  The importance of this assertion lies in the fact 
that Michigan courts can only divide property according to an explicit command from 
one of Michigan’s four property distribution statutes.51  
 Michigan has four property distribution statutes.  The four statutes are: MCLA § 
552.19 (“§ 19”) discussing what constitutes marital property; 552.18 (“§ 18”), addressing 
the division of pension benefits; MCLA § 552.401 (“§ 401”), authorizing the division of 
property if the other party substantially contributed to that separate property; and MCLA 
                                                          
46 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 121; see also John F. Schaefer, The Uncertain State of 
Michigan Equitable Distribution Law Post-Reeves, Michigan Bar Journal, 79 Mich. B.J. 168,  (2000). 
47 See Stamadianos v. Stamadianos, 425 Mich. 1, 4-5, 385 N.W.2d 604, 606 (1986); see also Turner, 
Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 116; see also Charlton v. Charlton, 397 Mich. 84, 92, 243 
N.W.2d 1, 265 (1976).  The court in Charlton v. Charlton makes it clear that in Michigan “[t]he laws of 
divorce are statutory in nature and the equitable disposition of property is confined to the limits of the 
applicable statutes.”  Id. 
48 425 Mich. 1, 385 N.W.2d 604, (1986). 
49 Stamadianos v. Stamadianos, 425 Mich. 1, 4-5, 385 N.W.2d 604 (1986). 
50 Id. at 5. 
 13 
§ 552.23 (“§ 23”), allowing the division of separate property if there is an insufficiency 
of wealth. 
 A. THE ROLES OF  MCLA § 552.19 AND MCLA § 552. 18 
 Generally, there has been less written on § 19 and § 18.  Court opinions tend to 
focus on the broader, and perhaps more easily understandable, provisions of § 401 and § 
23.  However, § 19 and § 18 play a vital role in Michigan’s system.   
 Section 19 is a fairly enigmatic and vague statute.  A plain reading of the statute 
reveals very little by way of what function it was meant to ultimately serve in the 
property division scheme.  Section 19 reads as follows: 
Upon the annulment of a marriage, a divorce from the bonds of matrimony 
or a judgment of separate maintenance, the court may make a further 
judgment for restoring to either party the whole, or such parts as it shall 
deem just and reasonable, of the real and personal estate that shall have 
come to either party by reason of the marriage, or for awarding to either 
party the value thereof, to be paid by either party in money. 
 
 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19 (2001). (emphasis added). 
 
 The Court of Appeals in Reeves cited § 19 as the starting point for courts when 
dividing property.52  Additionally, at least one scholar has argued that perhaps § 19 may 
serve an even greater function, due to its ambiguous terms, by allowing trial courts to 
enlarge exactly what constitutes the divisible marital estate.53 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
51 See Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 116-18.  This assertion further undercuts any 
argument that Michigan possesses a  unitary system.  Recall that the unitary property division advocates 
argue that Michigan’s system is not fully statutory. 
52 See Reeves v. Reeves, 226 Mich. App. 490, 493, 575 N.W.2d 1, 2-4 (1997). 
53 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 121.  Mr. Turner has hypothesized that  
perhaps § 19 allows for the enlargement of divisible marital property by an expansive reading of the terms 
shall have “come to either party” by reason of the marriage.  Id.  Theoretically, this would allow the courts 
to convert separate property into marital property, capable of division, without resorting to the 
authorization provisions of the other statutes.  
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 Section 18 deals with the division of vested pension benefits.  Section 18 reads: 
 Any rights in and to vested pension, annuity, or retirement benefits, or 
accumulated contributions in any pension, annuity, or retirement system, 
payable to or on behalf of a party on account of service credit accrued by 
the party during the marriage shall be considered part of the marital estate 
subject to award by the court under this chapter. 
 
 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.18 (2001). 
 
 Section 18 is fairly self-explanatory.  Its terms allow for the inclusion of vested 
retirement benefits accrued by either party during the marriage to be included in the 
marital estate.  It does not, however, by its terms envision a situation where it would be 
permissible for courts to divide benefits accrued before the marriage.54  Nonetheless, 
courts have found that pension benefits accrued before the marriage may be divided 
under § 18.55  
B. THE INTERACTION OF  MCLA § 552.23 AND MCLA § 552.401 
 Sections 23 and 401 have been extensively dealt with by the courts in Michigan.  
The Michigan Supreme Court case directly addressing the interplay between these two 
statutes is Charlton v. Charlton.56  In that case, the court asserts that Michigan possesses 
a statutory property distribution system, and that property can only be distributed 
according to a command from one of the four statutes.57 
                                                          
54 See id. at 120. 
55 See McMichael v. McMichael, 217 Mich. App. 723, 730, 352 N.W.2d 688, 690-92 (1996); see also 
Boonstra v. Boonstra, 209 Mich. App. 558, 562, 531 N.W.2d 777, 779 (1995); see also Turner, Eating 
Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 120.  The relevance of these findings cannot be understated since 
this explicit finding, contrary to the command of any of the four property division statutes, may support 
arguments for a unitary classification system in Michigan. 
56 397 Mich. 84, 243 N.W.2d 261 (1976). 
57 See Charlton v.Charlton, 397 Mich. 84, 92, 243 N.W.2d 261 (1976). 
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 Essentially, a reading of § 23 and § 401 provides authorization for the division of 
separate property under certain fact specific, non-overlapping situations.58  The first 
situation, according to the court in Charlton, are the circumstances of  § 23 where the 
“property of either party can be awarded to the other party provided the ‘estate and 
effects awarded to either party shall be insufficient.’”59   The second statute § 401, 
describes a situation where the separate property of either party may be awarded to the 
other if it appears as though one of the parties substantially contributed to the property’s 
acquisition.60  Note, however, that a better reasoned approach would be to look to the 
provisions of § 401 first, and then utilize the need based provisions of § 23.61   
The pertinent part of § 23 reads: 
 Upon entry of judgment of divorce or separate maintenance, if the estate 
and effects awarded to either party are insufficient for the suitable support 
and maintenance of either party and any children of the marriage as are 
committed to the care and custody of either party, the court may further 
award to either party the part of the real and personal estate of either party 
and spousal support out of the real and personal estate . . . after 
considering the ability of the either party to pay and the character and 
situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances of the case. 
 
 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 522.23 (2001). 
 
   Section 23 seems to envision a situation where the separate property awarded to 
each spouse is not enough to maintain that spouse or the children in the manner to which 
they had become accustomed.62  By its own terms, it allows for the awarding of the other 
                                                          
58 See id. at 93; see also Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 117. 
59 Id.  (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23 (2001)). 
60 See id. 
61 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 120. 
62 See id. at 120; see also Charlton, 397 Mich. at 94. 
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spouse’s real or personal estate, if the portion originally awarded was “insufficient for the 
suitable support and maintenance . . . .”63   
   Furthermore, this proposition seems to be supported by the Michigan Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Denman v. Denman.64  In that case, the Court of Appeals using the 
language from Charlton  and the reasoning in Grotelueschen v. Grotelueschen,65 affirmed 
a decision awarding part of one spouse’s inheritance to the other.66  The court found that 
an inheritance, normally considered separate property, may be “treated as part of the 
marital estate ‘if an award otherwise was insufficient to maintain either party.’”67   The 
problem with § 23 is that an expansive reading of it threatens to eclipse the other 
statutes.68    
 Whereas § 23 looked only to the needs of the parties, § 401 realizes that a party 
should be entitled to portion of that property to which they had contributed.  Section 401 
reads: 
 The circuit court of this state may include in any decree of divorce or of 
separate maintenance entered in the circuit court appropriate provisions 
awarding to a party all or a portion of the property, either real or personal 
owned by his or her spouse as it appears to be equitable under all the 
circumstances of the case, if it appears from the evidence in the case that 
the party contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of 
the property.   
 
 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.401 (2001). (emphasis added). 
                                                          
63 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23 (2001). 
64 195 Mich. App. 109, 489 N.W.2d 161 (1992). 
65 113 Mich. App. 395, 318 N.W.2d 227 (1982). 
66 See Denman v. Denman, 195 Mich. App. 109, 489 N.W.2d 161 (1992). 
67 Id. at 112; (quoting Grotelueschen v. Grotelueschen, 113 Mich. App. 395, 400 318 N.W.2d 227 (1982)).  
As an interesting note, and as further proof that § 23 and § 401 should be read separately, the court in 
Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 495, held that the separate estate “was unavailable for invasion because the 
other spouse had no involvement with that estate.” Id.   (emphasis added). 
68 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 46, at 120.  As such, Mr. Turner espouses the use 
of § 23 as “a remedy of last resort for financial need.”  Id. 
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 Section 401 mandates that the court take into account the individual efforts of 
each spouse regarding the other spouse’s separate property.69  Thus, if it appears that the 
non-owing spouse substantially contributed to the owning spouse’s “acquisition, 
improvement, or accumulation of the property” that spouse can be awarded a portion of 
the owning spouse’s property.70 
V. NAVIGATING THE MICHIGAN STATUTORY SCHEME  
 As was previously mentioned, the court's opinion in Reeves clearly states that 
Michigan has adopted a dual classification property distribution system.71  Additionally, 
this opinion introduces the doctrine of noninvasion and quite adequately covers the 
exceptions to this doctrine.72  While explaining the exceptions, the Court of Appeals also 
briefly described how the system should function.73   However, there remains some 
ambiguity and a few unanswered questions.   
Utilizing the language found in § 19, the Court of Appeals states that “the court 
may divide all property that came ‘to either party by reason of the marriage. . . . .’”74   
Unfortunately, the court provided very little guidance on just what the statutory language 
                                                          
69 See Lee v. Lee, 191 Mich. App. 73, 78, 477 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1991).  This court seems to affirm the 
notion that it is reversible error to not take into account the other statutes.  See id.  In other words, it is 
arguably a mandatory step in the property distribution system to consider the effects of the statutes. 
70 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.401 (2001). 
71 See Reeves v. Reeves, 226 Mich. App. 490, 493-94, 575 N.W.2d 1, 2-4 (1997). 
72 See id. 
73 See id.  The section of the opinion emphasizing the workings of the entire system is somewhat brief.  
The Court of Appeals writes, “[t]he distribution of property is controlled by statute . . . . In granting a 
divorce, the court may divide all property that came ‘to either party by reason of the marriage . . . .” MCL § 
552.19; MSA 25.99 (emphasis added).  When apportioning marital property the court must strive for an 
equitable division of increases in marital assets ‘that may have occurred between the beginning and the end 
of the marriage.’  Bone v. Bone, 148 Mich. App. 834, 838; 285 N.W.2d 706 (1986) (emphasis added).  
Thus, the trial court’s first consideration when dividing property in divorce proceedings is the 
determination of marital and separate assets.  Byington v. Byington, 224 Mich. App. 103, 114, n.4, 568 
N.W.2d 141 (1997). . . . Generally, the marital estate is divided between the parties, and each party takes 
away from the marriage that party’s separate estate with no invasion by the other party.  However, a 
spouse’s separate estate can be opened for redistribution when one of the statutory created exceptions is 
met.”  Byington, 224 Mich. App. at 114. 
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‘by reason of the marriage’ means.  Additionally, the court’s opinion is silent as to how 
property determined to be marital property should be divided.  Further, the court only 
mentions two exceptions § 23 and § 401.  This may merely be an oversight, but Michigan 
has a third exception, § 18.  By its terms, § 18 applies only to a very limited fact specific 
situation.  However, it has been applied broadly and perhaps inaccurately by a number of 
courts.75  As such, the role of § 18 in the statutory scheme must be clarified.  The 
following two sections will address the concerns just mentioned and provide an 
elaboration on the Reeves interpreted statutory scheme.  
A. DEFINING MARITAL PROPERTY: MCLA § 552.19 
First, § 19 provides a working, although difficult, definition of what constitutes 
marital property.76  Generally, this is unlike the system in place in other states.  In other 
states, the separate property is defined, taken out of the property distribution process, and 
then the remaining marital property is divided.77  Michigan’s process works in just the 
opposite manner.  Separate property generally remains undefined.  Instead, marital 
property is defined, divided, and the remaining property is considered nondivisible 
separate property--unless a statutory exception applies.78  Marital property is defined by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
74 Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19). 
75 See McMichael v. McMichael, 217 Mich. App. 723, 731, 352 N.W.2d 688, 690-92 (1996); see also Brett 
R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in Michigan, Divorce 
Litigation, June 2000, at 120. 
76 See id.  
77 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (2001). 
78 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 75, at 116-21; see also Byington, 224 Mich. App. 
at 118.  This opinion authored just months before the Court of Appeals’ decision in Reeves v. Reeves says 
“there is no bright-line rule that classifies an asset as ‘marital property’ or ‘separate property.’  The trial 
court must examine when the asset was acquired and the claiming spouse’s contribution to the acquisition 
improvement or accumulation of the property case by case.”  Id. 
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statute as property “that shall have come to either party by reason of the marriage.”79  So 
the question becomes, what precisely does this language mean?   
 This phrase would first include property acquired by the marital unit during the 
marriage.80  The Court of Appeals’ exact language called “for an equitable division of 
increases of marital assets ‘that may have occurred between the beginning and the end of 
the marriage.’”81  So, at first glance, any assets acquired during the course of the 
marriage become marital property and, by implication, any assets acquired before the 
marriage become separate property and may not be divided--unless a statutory exception 
applies.   
This reach-back mechanism provided by the statutes in Michigan is also 
somewhat dissimilar to the process used in most dual classification jurisdictions.  
Generally, there is no provision for reaching back into one party’s separate estate once a 
preliminary division of assets has occurred.  Recall, the more frequently used statutory 
reach-back exceptions address the needs of the parties and the contributions of the 
parties.82  There are compelling arguments for trying to avoid using one of the exceptions 
or reach-back statutes.  Furthermore, Michigan’s broad statutory language provides a 
way to avoid using the exceptions. 
To address the problems that could result from trial courts having to reach back 
into one party’s separate estate once the marital estate has been determined, § 19’s terms 
arguably include the potential for an expansive recharacterization of assets.83  The Court 
                                                          
79 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19. 
80 See Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 493-94.  
81 See id. (quoting Bone v. Bone, 148 Mich. App. 834, 838, 385 N.W.2d 706 (1986)). 
82 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 23 and § 401. 
83 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 75, at 120.  Please note, Mr. Turner does not 
advocate for a recharacterization theory, but does generally state that an expansive interpretation of the 
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of Appeals’ language is restrictive and would allow only for the division of assets 
acquired during the course of the marriage.84  This interpretation replaces the actual 
language of the statute with merely a time test.  An equitable division of assets should 
mean something more substantive than that.  Hence, the language of § 19 could 
encompass a factual scenario where an asset acquired by one of the parties prior to or 
from a source outside of the marriage, but used, considered, treated and/or objectively 
relied upon by the marital unit as marital property would fall under the terms of § 19.85  
Essentially, if the asset is indeed treated, considered and/or objectively ‘relied upon’86 as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statute can allow for separate property to come in depending on how that property was treated.  See id.   He 
uses the example of a husband’s premarital home, the exact example of which is reproduced below for the 
reader’s edification. 
84 See Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 493; see also John F. Schaefer, The Uncertain State of Michigan 
Equitable Distribution Law Post-Reeves, Michigan Bar Journal, 79 Mich. B.J. 168, 171 (2000). 
85 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 75, at 120.  Also note, Mr. Turner’s test seems to 
turn only on the treatment of the asset.  See id.  This writer has chosen to include a reliance factor for 
reasons that will be made clear in the following note. 
86 See Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 
689, 739-40 (1990); see also Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on 
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67, *19, 
(1993).  The author’s inspiration for including a reliance factor came from these two articles criticizing the 
marital partnership theory’s failure to fully provide for the needs of the dispossessed spouse (normally the 
wife).  The idea is that that a reliance factor would be based on a party’s expectations as to what they can 
expect in the future.  See Smith at 739-40.  Such a reliance results in an alteration of behavior due to future 
expectations.  Ms. Smith writes “[a] new rationale must acknowledge that life choices made in reliance on 
the continuation of marriage--choices to have children, to invest in the human capital of the primary 
breadwinner, and to divide roles to enhance the economic productivity of one spouse—may entail ongoing 
burdens that survive beyond marriage.”  Smith at 739-40.  Concededly, Ms. Smith is probably referring to a 
system that would provide continued support in the form of alimony or alimony-like payments, but this 
author is using it to make an argument for the recharacterization of property.  For example, consider the 
following hypothetical.  Suppose that a husband owns a hunting lodge.  That the lodge is only used by the 
husband, is not considered or treated by the couple as the wife’s property, but it is assumed that the lodge 
would be sold someday in the distant future to help provide for the retirement of the husband and wife.  Of 
course, an argument could be made that in substance, at some level the lodge was perhaps considered the 
marital units if it was acknowledged by both that it would be sold.  However, a straightforward reliance 
argument would be easier to use.  The wife could argue that she relied upon, altered her behavior in 
reliance on, the sale of that hunting lodge.  This reliance argument could give the court a reason to 
recharacterize the property as marital property and thus more easily divisible.   The vague language of 
Michigan’s statute would allow a lawyer to argue that the value of that lodge came to the wife ‘by reason 
of the marriage.’  Arguably, need is provided for in § 23, but allowing for the recharacterization of an asset 
would prevent the type of acrimony that can result from a party’s perception that their separate property is 
being taken from them and given to the other. 
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marital property then it can be said that the non-owning spouse came to that particular 
separate asset, “by reason of the marriage.”87  Hence, the courts could expand what 
constitutes divisible marital property and not have to utilize one of the other reach-back 
exceptions in order arrive at an equitable distribution. 
 The recharacterization aspect of § 19, however, can also serve to diminish the 
marital estate.  Take, for example, a cottage previously owned by only one spouse but 
never used by the non-owning spouse, never considered the property of the other spouse, 
nor ever relied upon for any particular reason by the non-owning spouse.88  That 
particular property never came to the non-owning spouse by reason of the marriage.89  
Indeed, a similar interpretation of § 19 has been followed by at least one decision out of 
the Court of Appeals.90 
Arguably, the substantive recharacterization aspect of §19 would allow for more 
amicable property settlements.  Parties are less likely to object to the division of the 
marital estate—even if that estate as been expanded by operation of statute—than they 
would be to reaching back into the separate estates of the owning parties to arrive at an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
           Professor Starnes notes that a reliance model would “seek[] to protect a promisee’s interest in being 
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have 
been in had the contract not been made.”  Starnes at *19.          
87 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 74,at 120.  Mr. Turner writes, “§ 19 may enlarge 
the marital estate beyond the mere fruits of marital efforts.  An asset can ‘come to the party’ even if it is not 
owned outright.  For instance, if the husband’s premarital residence serves as the marital home for a long 
marriage, could it not be said that the home ‘came to’ to the wife the wife by reason of the marriage?  The 
wife certainly ‘came to’ the home for that reason: Likewise § 19 would seem to permit the division of 
separate property placed into joint title for any significant period of time.  These fact situations share the 
common thread the nonmarital property was treated as marital property during the marriage.  Where such 
treatment is significant and lasts a long period of time, the court may be justified in dividing property 
which was not in the strict sense a product of the marital partnership.”  Id. 
88 See Anderson v. Anderson, No. 226676, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 1889, *7-*8 (Nov. 16, 2001).  This 
Court of Appeals’ decision dealt with the keeping of an inherited interest in real estate separate from the 
marital estate.  Although this decision does not support the reliance argument, it could be said that it 
supports the more narrow Turner-inspired ‘treatment’ argument. 
89See id.   
90 See id. 
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equitable distribution.  Indeed, the recharacterization aspect of § 19 can also be credited 
with the advantage of looking to substance over form.  Although the language from the 
Court of Appeals essentially restricts marital property to that property acquired during 
the marriage’s existence, the recharacterization aspect of § 19 could allow for the 
exclusion of inherited or gifted separate property acquired during the marriage.  Possibly, 
it is only a play on definitions, but intuitively, one would expect that parties are less 
likely to view the division as a hostile taking from one and giving to the other.  
B. DIVIDING THE MARITAL ESTATE  
 Now that marital property is established, the question then becomes how to divide 
that property equitably.  The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Reeves does not address this 
subject.91  This is where the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sparks v. Sparks fits into the 
equation.92  The court in Sparks included a list of nine factors that can be used to divide 
the marital estate.93  Trial courts, after first establishing the marital estate using § 19, may 
now seek to divide that estate in order to reach an equitable result using the factors laid 
out in Sparks.  Using the Sparks factors should not negate the statutory nature of 
Michigan’s system.94  Indeed, the Supreme Court is merely using its interstitial law 
making power by providing the factors upon which trial courts may rely.95 
                                                          
91 See Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 499-00 (Neff P.J., dissenting).  Indeed, the dissent notes that the even if 
the separate estates were ‘invaded,’ that MCLA § 552.23 allows for that invasion and further that the trial 
court considered the factors laid out in Sparks v. Sparks.  As such, Judge Neff found no error in the lower 
court’s distribution. 
92 See Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks, supra note 75, at 116. 
93 See Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 159-60, 485 N.W.2d 893 (1992). “[T]he following factors are to 
be considered wherever they are relevant to the circumstances of the particular case:  (1) duration of the 
marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate, (3) age of the parties, (4) health of the 
parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6) necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of  
the parties, (8) past relations and conduct of the parties, (9) general principles of equity.”  Id.  
94 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 75, at 116. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
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 At this point, the marital property has been determined using § 19 and divided 
using the factors established by the Supreme Court in Sparks.  The court must now 
consider whether any of the statutory exceptions apply.  Indeed, it appears as though this 
is a required step in the statutory distribution scheme.  The Court of Appeals in Lee v. 
Lee96 held that a trial court erred by not considering the effect that the exceptions 
embodied in § 23 and § 401 would have on the distribution of property.97 
 C. THE ROLES PLAYED BY THE OTHER EXCEPTIONS 
 The first exception is embodied in § 401.  This provides for the invasion of a 
separate property if it can be found that the non-owning spouse substantially contributed 
to the acquisition, improvement etc. of the owning spouse’s property.98  Clearly, this 
would include property that a non-owning spouse had actually worked on, or when a 
non-owning spouse “significantly assists in the acquisition or growth of a spouse’s 
separate asset . . . .”99  It could also include fact scenarios where due to the non-owning 
spouse’s efforts the owning spouse was able to devote more time to a thriving 
business.100  Under that scenario, it could be said that the non-owning spouse directly 
contributed to the property’s acquisition or improvement.101 
 Second, there is the exception embodied in § 23.  As the court in Reeves pointed 
out, this is the need-based statute.102  If, after dividing the marital property according to 
                                                          
96 191 Mich. App. 73, 477 N.W.2d 432 (1991). 
97See Lee v. Lee, 191 Mich. App. 73, 78-79, 477 N.W.2d 432 (1991). 
98 See Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 494-95; see also Charlton v.Charlton, 397 Mich. 84, 93-94, 243 N.W.2d 
261 (1976). 
99 Id. 
100 See Hanaway v. Hanaway, 208 Mich. App. 278, 294, 527 N.W.2d 792, (1995).  The Court in this case 
noted that just because “plaintiff’s contribution to the asset came in the form of household and family 
services is irrelevant.  The marriage was a partnership.  The couple nurtured a business and three children, 
and watched all four grow.  Defendant does not claim that he could have done it all himself.”  Id. 
101 See id. 
102 See Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 494. 
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the Sparks factors and awarding to the parties their separate property the court finds that 
the amount awarded is insufficient to provide for the needs of the non-owning spouse, the 
court may ‘invade’ the separate property and award it to that spouse.103  In making this 
determination, the court could inquire as to whether the award of the share of the marital 
property would be sufficient to provide for the non-owning spouse in the manner to 
which he or she had become accustomed.104  If the court finds that that portion of 
property awarded is insufficient, then that division cannot be considered equitable.  
Hence an invasion of the owning spouses assets is authorized.  
 The last exception to the doctrine of noninvasion is §18.  By its terms, § 18 
applies to a very fact specific situation.  Section 18 applies only to pension benefits 
vested during the marriage.105  However, it has been applied in a very broad and arguably 
inappropriate manner.106  When applying § 18, the courts have noted that its terms limit 
its application, but just as often as not have disregarded those terms and divided pension 
benefits that have vested before the marriage.107  To be true to the statutory analysis in 
Michigan, the courts should apply § 18 according to its terms.  As such, pension benefits 
acquired before the marriage would be considered no different than other separate 
property and could be divided only if one of the other exceptions found in § 23 or § 401 
applies.108       
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW 
A survey of the most recent Court of Appeals’ decision post-Reeves leaves little  
                                                          
103 See id. 
104 See Charlton, 397 Mich. at 94; see also Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 494. 
105 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.18. 
106 See McMichael, 217 Mich. App. at 731 
107 See id. 
108 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 75, at 120. 
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doubt that Michigan has fully adopted a dual classification distribution system consistent 
with most of the theories suggested in this paper.109  Nearly all of the Court of Appeals’ 
opinions evidence direct support for the reasoning and logic behind Reeves.110   However, 
all of these recent opinions have been unpublished.  Therefore, although they support the 
reasoning behind Reeves, they are of little precedential value and cannot be used for stare 
decisis.111 
These Appellate Court opinions almost invariably begin their analysis by noting 
that separate property and marital property exists.112  Further, the courts also clearly state 
that separate property may be invaded only if one of the specific statutes applies.113  As 
the Court of Appeals noted in Zerrenner v. Zerrenner, “[d]istribution of property 
pursuant to a divorce requires an initial determination of whether a particular asset is a 
marital asset or a separate asset.”114  The language used by the court in Anderson v. 
Anderson provides additional support for the dual classification system in Michigan.  In 
that case, the Court of Appeals said “[a] trial court’s initial consideration when 
undertaking to divide property in divorce proceedings is to discern whether property is 
part of the marital estate, or whether it is separate . . . .”115   That court also noted that 
“[m]arital property is ‘property that came to either party by reason of the marriage . . . 
                                                          
109 See Anderson v. Anderson, No. 226677, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1889 at *7 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
110 See Daly v. Daly, No. 217638, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis at *2 (June, 8 2001); see also McLean v. Mclean, 
No. 223757, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 802 at *3-4 (April 27, 2001); see also Bachran v. Bachran, No. 
226937, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1178 at *6 (August 21, 2001); see also Zerrenner v. Zerrenner, No. 
219301, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 621 at *2 (February 2, 2001); see also Stoudemire v. Stoudemire, 248 
Mich. App. 325, 334, 639 N.W.2d 274 (2001). 
111 See MCR 7.215 (C) (1).  The Court Rule specifically says “[a]n unpublished opinion is not 
precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis.”  Id. 
112 See McLean, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 802 at *3-4.  
113 See id. 
114 Zerrenner, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 621 at *2. 
115 Anderson, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1889 at *7. 
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.’”116  Even more support can be found in the court’s recitation of the law in Bachran v. 
Bachran.117  In that case the Court of Appeals held that separate property is not available 
for division unless a specific statute applies: 
A spouse’s separate property may be invaded for distribution only if: (1) after the 
distribution of the marital property, the distribution is insufficient for the suitable 
maintenance of either party, MCL 552.23 (1), or if (2) the trial court finds that the 
other spouse contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the 
property.  MCL 552.401 
 
 Bachran, 2001 Mich. App. at 6.   
 
These four quotes are just a few brief examples of the kind of language that has 
become all but boilerplate in the Court of Appeals’ decisions addressing the division of 
property.  It seems as though, unless overruled by the Supreme Court, the Reeves legal 
analysis is the standard in Michigan. 
 Furthermore, the Reeves/Turner-influenced application of Michigan’s statutory 
scheme seems to have found support in at least a few of the Court of Appeals’ cases. 
Recall that § 19 is the starting point in the property division scheme and that § 19 can 
allow for the recharacterization of an asset as marital property based on its treatment.118  
This recharacterization of assets was recently addressed by the Court of Appeals in two 
cases.119  The Court of Appeals’ decisions in Anderson v. Anderson and Smith v. Smith 
appear to lend support to a treatment based argument for classifying property as marital 
or separate.120 
                                                          
116 Id. (quoting MCLA § 552.19). 
117 Bachran, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1178 at *6.  
118 See Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in 
Michigan, Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 121; see also Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 493-94.  Note, no 
court has endorsed the argument supporting a reliance factor as a basis for property division. 
119 See Smith v. Smith, No. 222536, 2002 Mich. App. Lexis 109 at *2-4 (Jan. 29, 2002); see also Anderson, 
2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1889 at *7. 
120 See Smith 2002 Mich. App. Lexis 109 at *2-4; see also Anderson, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1889 at *7.  
In Smith v. Smith, the plaintiff alleged that the trial court erred by not including a cottage in the marital 
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 It also appears as though the Court of Appeals has adopted the proposition that 
the use of the factors outlined by the court in Sparks should be used only to divide the 
marital estate.121  In McLean v. McLean, the court included the now common-place 
Reeves language stating that “the marital estate is divided between the parties, and each 
party takes that party’s own separate estate without any invasion of the other.”122  The 
court then finds that the home in dispute was part of the marital estate.  Additionally, the 
court finds that the factors that should be considered when dividing the home include the 
duration of the marriage, contributions of the parties, age and health of the parties, and so 
on.123  In other words, the court divided the property into two separate estates, pursuant 
to statutory guidelines, and then divided the marital estate using the factors listed by the 
court in Sparks.124 
 Section 401, as first interpreted by the Supreme Court in Charlton v. Charlton has 
been read consistently with that decision by the Court of Appeals.   In Zerrenner v. 
Zerrenner, the Court of Appeals refused to hold that a portion of one spouse’s law firm 
should be excluded from the marital estate when there was evidence that the non-owning 
spouse worked in the firm and contributed to its success.125  Other courts’ mention or use 
                                                                                                                                                                             
estate. In its review of this allegation, the court noted that “defendant’s temporary ownership of a joint 
interest in the cottage did not result in any increase in the parties’ net worth . . . . Moreover, there is no 
evidence that defendant occupied the residence.”  Id.   The court then concluded by saying that 
“[a]ccordingly, we do not believe that the trial court’s exclusion of the cottage from the marital estate was 
clearly erroneous.”  Id.  The facts of Anderson were discussed previously in an earlier section. 
121 See McLean, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 802 at *4-5. 
122 Id. 
123 See id. (quoting McDougal v. McDougal, 451 Mich. 80, 89, 545 N.W.2d 357 (1996)). 
124 See id. 
125 See id. at *4-5. 
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of § 401 reveals that they would apply it in a manner keeping with the precedent 
established by Charlton and Reeves.126 
Section 18 is the last statutory provision that the Court of Appeals has still refused 
to properly reconcile with its own statutory language.  Indeed, in almost all cases post-
Reeves the court correctly interprets § 18 as allowing for the inclusion of pension benefits 
accrued during the marriage.127  In its very next breath, however, the court is quick to 
point out that “pension benefits accrued before or after the marriage may be subject to 
property division.”128  This statement alone is not necessarily incorrect provided it is 
properly qualified with statutory authority.  In other words, that same statement should be 
properly stated as pension benefits accrued before or after a marriage may be divided if 
there is a need according to § 23, or if the other party somehow contributed to the 
acquisition of the pension benefit according to § 401.129  The most recent Court of 
Appeals’ opinions refuse to qualify their statements permitting the division of pension 
benefits.130  Indeed, these cases continue to cite case law as providing the authority 
necessary to divide pension benefits accrued outside the parameters of § 18.131  
VII. THE NEED FOR A RESOLUTION 
Generally, the controversy over whether Michigan’s statutory scheme is a unitary 
classification system or a dual classification system has been resolved by default.132  
                                                          
126 See Estepp v. Estepp, No. 225018, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis at *5 (Oct. 23, 2001); see also Daly, 2001 
Mich. App. Lexis 1493 at *5; see also Zerrenner, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 621 at *6; see also Mclean, 2001 
Mich. App. Lexis at *3-4. 
127 See Medina, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1259 at *11 (Aug. 3 2001); see also Bachran, 2001 Mich. App. 
Lexis 1178 at *2-3. 
128 Bachran, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1178 at *2-3. 
129 See Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks, supra note 118, at 115-17. 
130 See id. 
131 See id.  In that particular case the court cited Boonstra v. Boonstra, 209 Mich. App. 558, 563 (1993), 
and Booth v. Booth, 194 Mich. App. 284, 291 (1992). 
132 See MCR 7.215 (I) (1) (2001). 
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Reeves has stated the law in Michigan and the other panels of the Court of Appeals are 
bound to follow it—and so far, nearly all have without question.  However, it should be 
noted that some level of controversy and doubt will continue to exist unless or until the 
Michigan Supreme Court or the Michigan Legislature acts on the matter.  Furthermore, 
although the state of the law was clearly enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Reeves, it 
left a number of unanswered questions.  Chief among those are exactly what constitutes 
marital property under § 19, and how does the judicially enhanced statutory scheme 
function.  These are basic questions and should be put to rest once and for all by the 
Michigan Supreme Court or the Michigan legislature.   
VIII. MARITAL PARTNERSHIP THEORY AT WORK IN MICHIGAN 
Now that the operation of the statutory system in Michigan has been discussed 
and at least three views on the operation of the system have been explored, it is necessary 
to approach the subject from a more philosophical perspective and ask whether the 
marital partnership theory, at present the most dominant view on marriage and divorce in 
the United States, is incorporated in Michigan’s system.133  The simple answer to this 
question is a both a resounding “yes,” and at the same time a very definitive “no.”134   
Despite Michigan’s uncertainty in terms of its property distribution laws, it will 
be shown that if the statutory scheme advocated and explained in this paper is in fact 
considered the law in Michigan, then Michigan has incorporated all of the very best 
aspects of the marital partnership theory and very few of its weaknesses.  Indeed, when 
viewed through the critical lenses of a number of scholars, the Michigan system is to be 
                                                          
133 See Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 
689, 696 (1990). 
134 See Hanaway v. Hanaway, 208 Mich. App. 278, 294, 527 N.W.2d 792, (1995).  The court in that case 
explicitly noted that “the marriage was a partnership.”  Id.  (emphasis added).   
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commended for its versatility and its flexibility.  Michigan’s dual classification system 
simultaneously incorporates the contributions of the parties and continues to focus on 
individual needs. 
The remainder of this paper will comment briefly on precisely what constitutes 
the marital partnership theory, its influences and development, its strengths and 
weaknesses, and most importantly how Michigan’s present system has managed to 
incorporate the theory into its statutory scheme.  
A. WHAT IS THE MARITAL PARTNERSHIP THEORY 
The marital partnership theory, now utilized to some extent in 49 states, attempts 
to transpose the well-developed, common-law principles of traditional partnership law 
onto the marital relationship.135  This particular theory views marriage as an economic 
partnership.136  Initially, the marital partnership theory found a great deal of acceptance 
on the part of reformers as a means for ensuring that the wife received a fair share of the 
property.137  Regarding property distribution, the marital partnership theory envisions a 
situation where the spouses are awarded a share of property to which they had 
contributed—regardless of the exact manner of that contribution.138  Much like the dual 
classification systems, property is generally divided on that basis into two categories, 
                                                          
135 See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Sharing a Piece of the Future Post-Divorce: Toward a More Equitable 
Distribution of Professional Goodwill, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 569, 593-94 (1999); see also Smith, supra note 
132, at 696.  Ms. Smith writes that [n]early every state currently embraces the community-property concept 
of marriage as a partnership.”  Id. 
136 See Kelly, supra note 135, at 593-94. 
137  See Smith, supra note 133, at 696.  The idea behind the marital partnership theory was that “each 
spouse makes a contribution entitled to recognition.”  Id at 689.  Ms. Smith also notes that the growth of 
this theory of marriage was in response to the then prevalent title theory used by the common-law property 
distribution states.  See id. at 696. 
138 See Kelly, supra note 135, at 593-94; see also Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution:  Implementing 
the Marital Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification System, 67 Miss. L .J. 115, 124-25 
(1997).  Ms. Bell expounding on the idea of marriage as a partnership writes “[t]he marital partnership 
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marital property and separate property.139  Furthermore, this division of property is not 
considered a discretionary award, but a right.140  Indeed, under marital partnership 
principles, a property award is granted “not because they [the other spouse] needs it, but 
because they have earned it.”141  Note, however, that this de-emphasis on need has been 
cited as one major weakness of the marital partnership theory.142 
 Beyond the scope of mere property division, the partnership model of marriage 
has been lauded as having “great conceptual appeal.”143  One of the basic tenets of 
partnership law is the equality of the partners.144  It was hoped that this sense of equality 
so prevalent in the traditional partnership sense, when transposed onto the marital 
relationship, would encourage the honoring of “commitments between spouses” and an 
equal sharing of assets within the relationship.145  Additionally, the very nature of the 
traditional partnership has a number of similarities to a marriage which made it easy for 
reformers of divorce law and proponents of the marital partnership theory to advocate for 
its acceptance and incorporation into state statutory schemes.146   
                                                                                                                                                                             
theory views marriage as a partnership in which both spouses contribute, financially or other wise, to the 
growth of the partnership and the acuumulation of assets.”  Id.  
139 See Smith, supra note 133, at 704. 
140 See Kelly, supra note 135, at 593-94. 
141 Id.  Ms. Kelly writes, “[e]ach spouse is considered an equal partner who has made different but equally 
meaningful contributions, including financial additions, to the acquisition of marital assets.  Thus each 
spouse is awarded a share of the marital estate, not because they need it but because they have earned it . . . 
. Each partner constructively consents to share both the risks and rewards of this project, so it seems 
entirely reasonable that each should have a claim to the fair share of assets should the partnership 
dissolve.” Id. 
142 See Smith, supra note 133, at 734.  Ms. Smith notes that the martial partnership theory emphasizes the 
division of property over the idea of continuing support in the form of alimony. 
143 See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, 
Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67, *22, (1993).     
144 See id. 
145 Id.  Professor Starnes has noted in her work that “‘[t]he ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal 
partnerships between spouses who share, resources, responsibilities, and risks’ and thus perhaps some 
limited duty to sacrifice for the good of the partnership.”  Id. 
146  See id.  Professor Starnes notes a number of similarities between the traditional partnership and a 
marriage.  She writes, “[b]oth relationships typically commence with the exchange of commitments . . . 
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 B. ORIGINS OF THE MARITAL PARTNERSHIP THEORY 
 Essentially, modern marital partnership theory has its origins in two different 
bodies of law.  In the first instance, marital partnership theory was inspired by the 
community property law already in place in the eight southwestern states.147  In the 
second instance, the partnership theory of marriage is clearly influenced by traditional 
partnership principles.148  Indeed, at least one scholar of this subject has found that the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act evidences a number of influences by the Uniform 
Partnership Act.149  Both of these bodies of law have played a role in the development of 
the modern marital partnership theory, and both have played a role its incorporation into 
the divorce statutes among the many states.150    
 Arguably, however, what truly spurred the widespread acceptance of the marital 
partnership theory was the advent of no fault divorce.151  Essentially, as divorce became 
easier to obtain, reformers wanting to see women receive an equal share of property, 
encouraged the adoption of the marital partnership theory.152  This awarding of property 
was seen as the best way to ensure that the women received some measure of security in 
the absence of continuing support from alimony.  Indeed, alimony issues are beyond the 
scope of this paper, but there has been a decreasing reliance on alimony since the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
[b]oth relationships seek profits, though profits in the case of a marriage may be emotional, sexual, and 
perhaps spiritual as well as financial.  Both often involve a specialization of labor.  Commonly one partner 
contributes capital primarily or exclusively, while another contributes services primarily or exclusively.”  
Id; see also, Smith, supra note 133, at 696.  Ms. Smith writes that “[d]ivorce reformers seized upon [the] 
notion of marriage as an economic partnership.”  Id.  
147 See Smith, supra note 133, at 689. 
148 See Starnes, supra note 143, at *23. 
149 See id.  Professor Starnes notes the partnership principles that seem to have “inspired the UMDA to 
adopt a partnership model for divorce.”  Id.   
150 See id.; see also Smith, supra note 133, at 696-98. 
151 See Smith, supra note 133, at 690; see also Starnes, supra note 143, at *8.  
152 See id. 
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adoption of the marital partnership theory; and, there are some that even view the 
awarding of alimony as a “threat to feminine independence.”153  
 C. WEAKNESSES/CRITICISMS OF THE MARITAL PARTNERSHIP THEORY 
 Increasingly, the marital partnership theory has come under attack.154  It has been 
criticized for not living up to its lofty objectives.155   The marital partnership theory has 
the advantage of sounding fair and equitable in an abstract sense, but has the potential for 
misuse depending on how a particular state’s property distribution system applies the 
theory.156   
 Scholars have identified a number of analytical weak points where states that 
have implemented the marital partnership theory may have caused more harm than good. 
These potential weaknesses/analytical flaws are quite easily summarized and generally fit 
into two broad categories.  First, a restrictive definition of precisely what constitutes 
marital property can have a detrimental effect on that category of property which is 
probably the most easily divided and most likely awarded to the wife.157  Second, an 
emphasis on the idea that property should be awarded mostly on the basis of a party’s 
contributions, or conversely, a de-emphasis on need as a basis for a property award can 
also serve to severely limit the property that will be awarded to the wife.158  This de-
emphasis on need has been strengthened by the adoption of “the clean break” idea of a 
                                                          
153 See Starnes, supra note 143, at *43.  Professor Starnes cites Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce 
Revolution, (Free Press, 1985).  Ostensibly, “[a]limony was sometimes viewed as an insult to women and 
an encumbrance to feminine independence.”  Id. 
154 See Smith, supra note 133, at 689.  Ms. Smith very blatantly says that  “the partnership model has failed 
to achieve its objectives of decreasing the economic hardships of divorce on the dependent spouse and 
children. . . .”  Id. 
155 See id. at 732. 
156 See Smith, supra note 133, at 689.  Ms. Smith refers to the theory as “politically shrewd.”  Id. 
157 See id. at 706; see also Kelly, supra note 135, at 595. 
158 See  id. at 735. 
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divorce.159   That is, the idea that when a marriage ends and property is distributed, there 
is no longer any need for continued support.  This particular application of the marital 
partnership theory has worked a severe disservice on divorced women.160 
 Regarding this first issue, the marital partnership theory requires the division of 
property.161  Property is divided into marital and separate property.  This is a critical 
threshold issue.162  Indeed, Ms. Smith notes that “[w]hether a spouse gains protection 
from a marital property system depends on how the system sorts separate and marital 
property.”163   It is for that reason that a very restrictive definition of what constitutes 
marital property injures the wife’s ability to achieve economic parity.  If, generally 
speaking, only marital property is divided, common sense says that if that category is 
kept small, then the wife, even if she receives the lion’s share of the estate, gets less 
overall.164   Indeed, most scholars advocating for the effective implementation of this 
ideology, note that this can only be achieved through an expansive definition of what 
constitutes martial property.165   
                                                          
159 See Kelly, supra note 135, at 593. 
160 See Starnes, supra note 143, at 8. 
161 See Smith, supra note 133, at 706. 
162 See Kelly, supra note 135, at 595. 
163 Smith, supra note 133, at 692. 
164 See Kelly, supra note 135, at 692.  Ms. Kelly’s article, Sharing a piece of the Future Post-Divorce:  
Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Goodwill, focuses on the importance of being able to include 
professional goodwill as a marital asset.  See id.  Ms. Kelly notes that most courts are reluctant to expand 
“the boundaries of what constitutes property.”  Id.  Ms. Kelly further notes, “[t]hose courts that refuse to 
recognize purely personal goodwill do so because it does not fit into conventional property concepts and 
instead appears to divide a share of a divorced spouse’s future income.”  Id. 
165 See id.; see also Starnes, supra note 143, at *8.  In her article on the subject, Professor Starnes 
addresses the importance of expanding the definition of what constitutes divisible marital property.  See id.  
She writes, “[s]ome courts and legislatures . . . have attempted to increase the pool of marital assets by 
expanding the definition of marital property.  An expanded definition might include such nontraditional 
assets as a spouse’s pension, goodwill in a business, and a professional degree or license.  Increasing the 
marital pot allows a court to award a low-income wife a larger share of traditional property or a lump-sum 
payment reflecting her share of nontraditional property.”  Id.   She also notes the concerns of  “[h]uman 
capital theorists” and the importance of ensuring that a wife is property compensated for contributing to a 
husband’s increased earning potential.  See id. at *24.  She does not reference this in terms of an inclusion 
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 Regarding the second issue, the idea that property awards should be based 
primarily on the extent of the parties contributions has, perhaps inadvertently, caused the 
former emphasis on needs of the parties to dissipate.166 Indeed, Ms. Smith writes that 
“[r]eliance on the marital partnership theory also caused the justification for sharing 
marital property to shift from monetary needs after marriage to nonmonetary 
contributions during marriage.”167  Essentially, by switching the focus of the courts’ 
attention to issues such as contributions and acquisitions of assets away from immediate 
economic need, the marital partnership theory when implemented has detracted the court 
from focusing on need.168  This focus away from need has had a particularly detrimental 
effect on women involved in relationships where the marital unit has not acquired a 
number of significant assets.169  Professor Starnes, focussing in on the homemaker, notes 
quite simply that a one-time property division will just not provide the support necessary 
for women in relationships where the acquired assets are minimal.170 
 D. THE WEAKNESSES APPLIED TO MICHIGAN’S SYSTEM  
 Essentially, the weaknesses outlined in the previous section do not apply to 
Michigan.  The dual classification system in place in Michigan may be complex, unique, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in marital property, but in a discussion of the UPA and their buy-out provisions.  She writes, “[t]he UPA 
buyout rules and their expansion in RUPA provide a useful analogy for the modern martial relationship . . . 
. A spouse’s decision to end the relationship results in her dissociation, but does not necessarily trigger a 
winding-up of any shared enterprise in which the spouses have invested.  If this enterprise continues, a 
dissociated spouse should receive a buyout of her investment.”  Id. at *24. 
166 Smith, supra note 133, at 734. 
167 Id. 
168 See id.  Concededly, most of the arguments addressing the need for continued support tend to focus on 
the need for alimony-like payments and not division of property issues, but the concerns are still persuasive 
and applicable when discussing property division. 
169 See Starnes, supra note 143, at *8.  Professor Starnes addresses, at length, the difficulties women face 
upon divorce.  These difficulties become acute when the division of property is considered the only means 
of support that the wife will receive from the marriage.   
170 See id. “When marital assets are substantial, a court might ease the financial straits of a homemaker with 
low income potential by awarding a significant amount of the marital property.  Most marital estates, 
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difficult to understand, and arguably uncertain, but it has the distinct advantage of 
flexible application.  Indeed, the Michigan statutory system, due to its broad definition of 
what can constitute marital property, its specific allowance for the contributions of the 
parties, both in the division of marital property and in the use of awarding separate 
property to another spouse, and most importantly, its § 23 “need based” provision 
ensures that the very best principles of the marital partnership theory are applied, yet 
provides for a “safety valve” continuing focus on need.171 
  Regarding the definition of what can constitute marital property.  Repeatedly, 
those who study the subject suggest that for the marital partnership concept to succeed,  
marital property must be defined broadly.172  It makes intuitive sense to enlarge that 
category of property which is most easily divided.  Michigan clearly provides for this.  If 
§ 19 can be seen as the statute which defines marital property, it allows for the inclusion 
of any property which came to the parties by “reason of the marriage.”173  This provision, 
is arguably, as broad a provision as one could draft.   
 First, textually there appears to be no restriction on what can constitute property.  
Therefore, Michigan’s broad definition should allow goodwill, professional degrees, and 
other nontraditional forms of property  to come into the marital estate.  Second, this 
author has argued that § 19 includes a “recharacterization provision” allowing for 
property, which traditionally would be considered separate property, but is treated, 
considered, and/or relied upon as marital property to be recharacterized as marital 
                                                                                                                                                                             
however, are too small to make this option feasible.  It is not unusual for lower and middle-class couples to 
live from paycheck to paycheck and to own few if any significant assets.”  Id. 
171 Brett R. Turner, Eating Jello with Chopsticks: The Elusive Concept of Separate Property in Michigan, 
Divorce Litigation, June 2000, at 120.  Mr. Turner refers to § 23 as a “safety valve.”  Id.  He makes no 
reference to its application in a marital partnership sense. 
172 See Smith, supra 133, at 706. 
 37 
property.174   Third, most state statutes adhering to the marital partnership theory 
explicitly allow for property to be awarded on the basis of the parties contributions.  
Michigan is no exception, and indeed, makes an extra provision.  In Michigan the 
contributions of the parties are considered in the division of martial property.175  Also, the 
specific contributions of the parties are considered yet again when separate property is 
reviewed.176  In other words, the Michigan statutory system looks twice to see that the 
contributions of the parties are taken into account.  And, in fact, it is a mandatory step in 
the property division process.177  Michigan should be applauded for taking such extra 
precautions when looking at the contributions of the parties.  Indeed, by taking such 
precautions it has incorporated the very best aspects of the marital partnership theory.  
Note, however, that with the inclusion of § 23 it has managed to avoid one of the main 
detracting points from full incorporation of the martial partnership theory.178  
 Perhaps the biggest criticism of the marital partnership theory is that it caused the 
focus to shift from need to contributions of the parties.179  Michigan does not possess that 
problem.  Indeed, Michigan takes the same type of extra precautions with need as it does 
with contributions.  Recall that the second factor in Sparks specifically addresses need, 
and more importantly, so does MCLA § 552.23.180  This particular statute ensures that 
the courts MUST focus on the needs of the parties when dividing even separate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
173 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19; see also Reeves, 226 Mich. App. at 494. 
174 See Turner, Eating Jello With Chopsticks, supra note 171, at 121.  Please note that this 
recharacterization theory was influenced by Brett Turner’s hypothetical of the family home becoming 
marital property because it came to the non-owning spouse, ‘by reason of the marriage.” 
175 See Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 159-60, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901 (1992). 
176 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.401. 
177 See Lee v. Lee, 191 Mich. App. 73, 78, 477 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1991). 
178 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23 
179 See Smith, supra note 133, at 734. 
180 See Sparks, 440 Mich. at 160. 
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property.181  The focus on need is still strong in Michigan.  Concededly, this does not go 
all the way in correcting the perception that the martial partnership theory also detracts 
from the notion of continuing support, but it prevents the courts from become entirely 
preoccupied with issues of contributions and acquisitions.  Recall, that the standard was 
set by the court in Charlton v. Charlton, and that the ultimate goal in Michigan for 
property distribution is to see a just and equitable division of property, to that end, the 
award must be such to ensure that the spouse will receive enough property to support her 
in the manner to which she had been accustomed.182  Michigan’s statutory system 
augmented by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sparks accomplishes that goal. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, the complex statutory system in Michigan requires clarification from the 
Michigan Legislature or from the Supreme Court.  The definition of marital property 
must be clearly defined, and the role of the factors listed by the Supreme Court in Sparks 
must be decided.  At the same time, however, the system used in Michigan is a unique 
system and has a number of very strong points.  It is flexible and can be driven easily by 
the facts of each particular case.  It allows for attorneys to make strong arguments for or 
against the inclusion of property into the marital estate.  It also calls for attorneys to use 
their skills of persuasion when advocating the division of an owning spouse’s separate 
property.   
Furthermore, Michigan has implemented all of the strong aspect of the marital 
partnership theory, and has managed to account for its weak points.  It defines marital 
                                                          
181 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23 
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property broadly, and never completely loses its focus on need.  Hopefully, any future 
clarification will not take away from the strength of the Michigan system in this regard.     
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
   
                                                                                                                                                                             
182 See Charlton v. Charlton, 397 Mich. 84, 94, 243 N.W.2d 261 (1976). 
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